Mabux: Global Bunker Prices

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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
900.00
+7.50
703.00
-2.00
Jan 20
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	900.00	+7.50	703.00	-2.00	Jan 20

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
539.69	-0.48	624.55	-0.95	800.20	-3.95	Jan 23

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MBP INDEX vs DBP INDEX (ICE/NYMEX)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	Diff	MBP Index	DBP Index	Diff	MBP Index	DBP Index	Diff	Date
Rotterdam	473	490	-17	546	555	-9	703	693	+10	Jan 23
Singapore	514	502	+12	597	597	0	727	726	+1	Jan 23
Fujairah	479	540	-61	587	605	-18	770	879	-109	Jan 23
Houston	470	506	-36	578	637	-59	755	764	-9	Jan 23

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Latest News
- 2025-01-23
  ASIA PACIFIC: LR ANNOUNCES KEY APPOINTMENT IN JAPAN
  Lloyd’s Register (LR) has appointed Jim Smith as its new Strategic Business Partner and Senior Representative in Japan. In his new role, Smith will be supported by Hiromitsu Kikuchi who has been appointed to the position of Deputy Senior Representative.... Read more
- 2025-01-23
  EUROPE: PORT OF AARHUS SHORE POWER PROJECT AGREEMENT FINALISED
  The Port of Aarhus has today announced that its agreement for a new PowerCon onshore power plant for container ships has been finalised. In a statement issued today (23 January), the Port of Aarhus said that PowerCon will deliver the transformer station... Read more
- 2025-01-23
  MIDDLE EAST: ASYAD SHIPPING HEADING FOR A MUSCAT STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING
  Oman’s Asyad Group has announced its intention to offer at least 20% of the issued share capital in Asyad Shipping Company through an Initial Public Offering (IPO). The offering forms part of Asyad Group's ambition to drive its operational growth,... Read more
- 2025-01-23
  GLOBAL: MPC CONTAINER SHIPS’ FIRST METHANOL DUAL-FUEL BOXSHIP DELIVERED
  MPC Container Ships has announced that its first methanol dual-fuel vessel, NCL Vestland, has been delivered. As previously reported, the Oslo-listed company announced the order of two, methanol-fuelled 1,300 TEU containerships in July 2022. Built... Read more
- 2025-01-23
  GLOBAL: UCL: SWITCH TO ZERO-EMISSION TECH OR BRACE FOR HEAVY CUTS TO THE GLOBAL FLEET
  A new report from UCL's Energy Institute Shipping and Oceans Research Group suggests that for shipping to attain its estimated share of the carbon budget of 9.6 giga tonnes, ships representing over one third of the existing and ordered fleet, valued at... Read more
- 2025-01-23
  MABUX: Bunker Weekly Outlook, Week 04, 2025.
  Over the 04th week, the MABUX global bunker indices continued a moderate upward movement. The 380 HSFO index increased by 1.92 USD, rising from 537.79 USD/MT to 539.71 USD/MT. Similarly, the VLSFO index climbed by 4.51 USD, reaching 626.15 USD/MT from... Read more Over the 04th week, the MABUX global bunker indices continued a moderate upward movement. The 380 HSFO index increased by 1.92 USD, rising from 537.79 USD/MT to 539.71 USD/MT. Similarly, the VLSFO index climbed by 4.51 USD, reaching 626.15 USD/MT from last week's 621.64 USD/MT. The MGO index also saw a gain of 2.77 USD, moving from 803.96 USD/MT to 806.73 USD/MT. However, as of this writing, early indications of a downward trend in the global bunker market have been observed.
  
  MABUX Global Scrubber Spread (SS) - the price between 380 HSFO and VLSFO – recorded a slight increase: plus $2.59 (from $83.85 last week to $86.44), but still remained below the $100.00 breakeven mark. The weekly average of the index grew by $3.67. In Rotterdam, the SS Spread narrowed by $1.00, dropping from $80.00 last week to $79.00, while the weekly average at the port rose by $1.00. Conversely, in Singapore, the 380 HSFO/VLSFO spread declined by $8.00, falling from $96.00 to $88.00, with the weekly average decreasing by $4.50. Throughout the week, the Global SS Spread and regional indices lacked a clear trend, consistently staying below the $100.00 threshold. We anticipate no significant changes in the SS Spread dynamics next week, with the indicators likely continuing their irregular fluctuations. More detailed information can be found in the "Differentials" section on mabux.com.
  
  Currently, gas prices, wind power generation, and demand levels show little volatility in the primary European electricity markets. Lower gas prices and increased wind power generation have driven down energy prices in some regional markets, while rising demand has pushed prices higher in others. Meanwhile, the natural gas market is expected to remain resilient and experience an upward trend in the medium term. This is largely attributed to the expansion of global LNG production capacity and the development of import infrastructure, which are solidifying LNG’s role as a key energy source in Europe. As of January 20, European regional storage facilities were 59.38% full (down 5.60% from last week and down 11.95% from the beginning of the year) and the gas withdrawal process was ongoing. At the end of Week 04, the European gas benchmark TTF rose by 3.08 EUR/MWh, exceeding the 50.00 EUR/MWh mark (50.027 EUR/MWh versus 46.947 EUR/MWh last week).
  
  The price of LNG as a bunker fuel in the port of Sines (Portugal) rose by USD 29 over the week, reaching USD 1,011/MT on January 20. Additionally, the price difference between LNG and conventional fuel widened on the same day, with MGO LS priced USD 209 lower than LNG, compared to a difference of USD 175 the previous week. MGO LS was quoted at USD 802/MT in the port of Sines on January 20. More detailed information is available in the LNG Bunkering section on mabux.com.
  
  During Week 04, the MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)—the ratio of market bunker prices (MBP Index) to the MABUX digital bunker benchmark (DBP Index)—registered mixed dynamics across the four major hubs: Rotterdam, Singapore, Fujairah, and Houston.
  
  • 380 HSFO segment: Singapore returned to the overcharge zone, with its weekly average rising by 6 points. The other three ports: Rotterdam, Fujairah and Houston remained undervalued, with underprice levels rising by 36 points in Rotterdam but decreasing by 6 points in Fujairah and 1 point in Houston.
  
  • VLSFO segment: All ports were in the undercharge zone. Weekly averages increased by 4 points in Rotterdam, 1 point in Singapore, and 6 points in Houston, while Fujairah saw a decline of 1 point. The MDI in Singapore remained close to 100% correlation between market price (MBP) and the digital bunker benchmark MABUX (DBP).
  
  • MGO LS segment: Singapore moved back into the undervalued zone, resulting in all ports being underpriced. Weekly averages rose by 1 point in Rotterdam, 9 points in Singapore, 8 points in Fujairah, and 15 points in Houston. The MDI indices in Rotterdam and Singapore remained near the 100% correlation mark between MBP and DBP, whereas Fujairah’s index continued to exceed the $100.00 mark.
  
  In terms of the balance between overvalued and undervalued ports, Singapore shifted to the overcharge zone in the 380 HSFO segment but returned to the undercharge zone in the MGO LS segment. Underpricing of bunker fuel remains the dominant trend in the global bunker market, and we expect this dynamic to persist into next week.
  
  Further insights on the correlation between market prices and the MABUX digital benchmark are available in the Digital Bunker Prices section of mabux.com.
  
  Integr8 Fuels has warned that 45% of global very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) supplies will fail to meet the RM380 requirements of the International Standards Organisation’s ISO 8217:2024 specification without adjustments to blending recipes. These changes, however, could result in a surge of problematic fuels. Singapore and Houston have been identified as "hot spots" for these adjustments, with two-thirds of VLSFO in Singapore requiring reformulation. Integr8 Fuels also flagged VLSFO sulphur compliance as a "pressing issue," noting that 2.4% of supplies exceeded the 95% allowable limits under ISO 8217 Table 2 parameters over the past six months. The report further highlighted the growing adoption of LNG and biofuels to comply with regulations such as FuelEU Maritime. Additionally, the upcoming introduction of the Mediterranean Emission Control Area (Med ECA) on 1 May is expected to drive increased LNG bunkering demand in the region. However, deliveries of LNG bunkering vessels are failing to keep pace with this rising demand, exacerbating challenges in the LNG supply chain.
  
  We expect a moderate downward trend to resume in the global bunker market next week.
  Source: MABUX
- 2025-01-23
  Oil prices extend losses on uncertainty over Trump tariff impact
  Oil prices dipped in Asian trade on Thursday, extending losses amid uncertainty over how U.S. President Donald Trump's proposed tariffs and energy policies would impact global economic growth and energy demand. Brent crude futures fell 26 cents, or 0.3%,... Read more Oil prices dipped in Asian trade on Thursday, extending losses amid uncertainty over how U.S. President Donald Trump's proposed tariffs and energy policies would impact global economic growth and energy demand.
  Brent crude futures fell 26 cents, or 0.3%, to $78.74 a barrel at 0427 GMT, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude (WTI) eased 23 cents, or 0.3%, to $75.21.
  In the prior session, Brent futures settled at $79.00 in a fifth straight day of losses and WTI futures settled at $75.44 in a fourth consecutive day of declines.
  "Oil markets have given back some recent gains due to mixed drivers," said senior market analyst Priyanka Sachdeva at Phillip Nova. "Key factors include expectations of increased U.S. production under President Trump's pro-drilling policies and easing geopolitical stress in Gaza, lifting fears of further escalation in supply disruption from key producing regions."
  The broader economic implications of U.S. tariffs could further dampen global oil demand growth, she added.
  Trump has said he would add new tariffs to his sanctions threat against Russia if the country does not make a deal to end its war in Ukraine. He added these could be applied to "other participating countries" as well.
  He also vowed to hit the European Union with tariffs, impose 25% tariffs against Canada and Mexico, and said his administration was discussing a 10% punitive duty on China because fentanyl is being sent to the U.S. from there.
  On Monday, he also declared a national energy emergency. That is intended to provide him with the authority to reduce environmental restrictions on energy infrastructure and projects and ease permitting for new transmission and pipeline infrastructure, though some analysts remain sceptical on the pace of oil production uptick in the near-term.
  
  "Overall, Trump's policies are introducing volatility, and the market will closely watch how sanctions, drilling expansions, and trade policies evolve in shaping the global oil landscape," Phillip Nova's Sachdeva said.
  Meanwhile, on the U.S. oil inventory front, crude stocks rose by 958,000 barrels in the week ended Jan. 17, according to sources citing American Petroleum Institute figures on Wednesday.
  Gasoline inventories rose by 3.23 million barrels, and distillate stocks climbed by 1.88 million barrels, they said. [API/S] Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2025-01-23
  The End of Cheap Oil? Sanctions Spark Scramble for Supply
  Just a month ago, the dominant narrative in energy news sections was one of surplus supply and consistently weak Chinese demand. Now, some are starting to talk about a deficit, especially after the Biden administration’s farewell sanction package aimed... Read more Just a month ago, the dominant narrative in energy news sections was one of surplus supply and consistently weak Chinese demand. Now, some are starting to talk about a deficit, especially after the Biden administration’s farewell sanction package aimed at Russia.
  
  John Kemp wrote a column about the state of global supply earlier this month, noting that “U.S. crude oil inventories have depleted much faster than normal since the middle of 2024.” Usually, the depletion of inventories is a result of strong demand, and indeed, U.S. demand, for all the predictions of the EIA, has proved resilient, even hitting a seasonal record at one point in spring 2024. That record was 800,000 bpd higher than EIA’s weekly estimates, which “unnerved market experts”, per Reuters.
  
  However, it was not only the United States. Crude oil inventories in the Organization for Cooperation and Development have also been depleting faster than many have hoped, chief among them the International Energy Agency, which, like the EIA in the United States, has consistently underestimated the balance between demand and supply in crude oil.
  
  Even if all these signals were overlooked, the effect that Biden sanctions had on international prices should have been proof enough that the surplus narrative is in a precarious relationship with reality. Had the oil market really been in surplus—and a large one—the sanctions would not have had any palpable effect on benchmarks.
  
  Consider the International Energy Agency’s November prediction that crude oil supply this year would exceed demand by as much as 1 million barrels daily—and that even if OPEC+ keeps its production caps in place. In January, the IEA allowed for a supply draw even though it stopped short of seeing a chance for a deficit.
  
  “If decreases in supply from weather impacts, sanctions, or other developments become substantial, oil stocks can quickly be drawn to meet operational requirements in the near term,” the agency said, citing Russian sanctions, the prospect of new Iranian sanctions, and the current seasonal jump in demand. What it did not cite were Trump’s plans to refill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is bound to push prices higher unless the new administration is very careful with the buying. The other thing that most forecasters do not seem to consider when they make their forecasts is production.
  
  The standard story is that non-OPEC supply, led by the United States, would surge so much this year that it would completely offset the continuing OPEC+ cuts and keep the world oversupplied. The fact that U.S. oil majors have signaled multiple times that they have no intention to do anything of the sort remains largely ignored by analysts—but not by oil traders.
  
  Kemp again reported this month that bullish bets on crude oil had increased to the highest volume in nine months in anticipation of the effect of sanctions on Russian and Iranian crude and, as a consequence of that, on global supply. Speculators had bought the equivalent of 330 million barrels across the six most traded contracts in the five weeks since December 10, Kemp wrote, bringing their total exposure to 553 million barrels—the highest since April last year.
  
  Even so, prices this week dipped following President Trump’s declaration of a national energy emergency and his sign-off on a slew of executive orders aimed at boosting the United States’ oil and gas production. The EIA again sounded a bearish note, repeating its prediction from last week that “Strong global growth in production of petroleum and other liquids and slower demand growth put downward pressure on prices.”
  
  Aramco, on the other hand, got bolder in the context of the latest developments with a bearing on oil prices. The company’s chief executive this week predicted that oil demand growth would strengthen to 1.3 million barrels daily this year, reaching a new all-time high of 1.6 million barrels daily, Amin Nasser said at the World Economic Forum gathering in Davos.
  
  It’s worth noting that the IEA also revised its demand growth expectations for this year, from an estimated 940,000 bpd for 2024 to 1.05 million bpd for this year. The agency cited an improved economic outlook as the reason for the revision—implicitly suggesting that the energy transition is not really affecting oil demand, despite claims to the contrary put forward repeatedly by the IEA itself and others.
  
  There is, of course, a possibility that oil prices will tank hard this year. That possibility is contingent on Trump’s removal of U.S. sanctions on Russia. Under such a scenario, whatever sanction action Trump takes on Iran, the market would hardly feel it. However, the prospect of such a move are, for the moment, of uncertain nature. This means that global oil supply remains constrained, while the hoped-for rate of production growth is as uncertain as Trump’s move on Russia sanctions.
  
  Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-01-23
  The UAE Signals a Strategic Realignment as Trump Returns to Office
  A cornerstone of Donald Trump’s foreign policy during his first U.S. presidency was the utilisation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a fulcrum by which he could leverage back China’s growing influence in the Middle East. Through a related energy policy... Read more A cornerstone of Donald Trump’s foreign policy during his first U.S. presidency was the utilisation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a fulcrum by which he could leverage back China’s growing influence in the Middle East. Through a related energy policy connected to India, he also hoped to counteract Beijing’s increasing dominance in Asia. When the UAE became the first major Arab state to sign an Abraham Accords peace agreement with Israel (brokered by the U.S.) on 13 August 2020, Trump’s Middle East strategy appeared to be going perfectly to plan. However, his loss of the presidency later the same year preceded a complete breakdown of that strategy under new President Joe Biden. During the latter’s tenure in office, China’s influence across the Middle East broadened and deepened at a pace matched only by the U.S.’s loss of power in the region. By the time Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the U.S.’s relationship with key leaders in the Middle East had reached such a low point that the UAE’s leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan refused even to take a telephone call from Biden to discuss how he might help alleviate the resultant spike in energy prices. Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman treated Biden’s request with the same contempt. It is exceptionally difficult to imagine either of them doing the same to Trump, so it is no surprise to see the UAE making moves to indicate that it may be edging back towards a closer relationship with Washington in his second term as president.
  
  The latest signs of such a realignment have come from the UAE’s awarding of contracts for the massive expansion of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) capabilities, centred on the Ruwais LNG Project. Once fully operational, the Ruwais LNG plant will more than double the current LNG production capacity of the UAE’s ADNOC Gas to over 15 million tonnes per annum (mtpa). Last week saw the UAE energy giant award US$2.1 billion in contracts to bolster its LNG supply infrastructure with the largest (valued at US$1.24 billion) going to a consortium consisting of the Egyptian firms, Engineering for the Petroleum and Process Industries (ENPPI) and Petrojet. As also detailed in my latest book, Egypt has been a key focus of the efforts by the U.S. and its allies to boost gas and LNG capacity to compensate for the loss of the same from Russia as sanctions against it have been ratcheted up since 2022. Multiple U.S. and allied firms – including ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, TotalEnergies, and ENI – are now at the forefront of these efforts in Egypt to help wean Europe off its former dependence on cheap Russian energy, which includes extensive on-the-ground presence across the country. These latest contracts for Ruwais are geared toward the build-out of an LNG pre-conditioning plant, compression facilities and transmission pipelines to supply feedstock to the Ruwais LNG Project. These will form a core element of ADNOC Gas’ Habshan 5 plant, which is part of the Habshan Complex and will have a combined 6.1 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day gas processing capacity. The newly awarded transmission pipelines will connect this Complex with the Ruwais LNG facility.
  
  On the other side of the equation, the most recent long-term supply contract for LNG from the plant was December’s 15-year sales and purchase agreement (SPA) for 0.6 mtpa of LNG with major Western firm, Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW) -- one of the largest operators of energy infrastructure in Germany and across Europe. This is the second such long-term deal between ADNOC Gas and a German firm, following November’s SPA for 1 mtpa for 15 years with SEFE Marketing and Trading Singapore Pte Ltd., a subsidiary of Germany’s SEFE Securing Energy for Europe GmbH. Highly significant in this context is the fact that it was Germany above all other countries in Europe that was seen by the U.S. and its key European allies of the U.K. and France as by far the weakest link in supporting meaningful sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Germany’s effective leadership position in the European Union (E.U.) -- the U.K. having earlier withdrawn from it -- and its longstanding reliance on cheap and plentiful Russian oil and gas to power its economic growth was seen as the key reason for Europe’s muted response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 (and subsequent annexation of Crimea), as also analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Indeed, just after the invasion, the only real flurry of activity within the EU was aimed at ensuring that Russia did not stop supplying its member states with either gas or oil, due to their not being able to pay in the way Moscow preferred. This followed the 31 March decree signed by President Vladimir Putin that required EU buyers to pay in roubles for Russian gas via a new currency conversion mechanism or risk having supplies suspended.
  
  That said, although the UAE had made plain its contempt for Biden in early 2022, its attitude changed later that year after the discovery by U.S. intelligence agencies that there was still activity around the port of Khalifa indicating China’s attempts to construct a secret military facility there had not ended. As highlighted by OilPrice.com at the time, the U.S. had made it very clear after discovering in December 2021 that China had been building such an installation that it looked forward to a new phase in its relationship with the UAE. In 2022, these hopes were conveyed even more forcefully by Washington to the UAE, and shortly afterwards, the UAE-Germany Energy Security and Industry Accelerator was signed with the purpose of ‘advancing cooperation in energy security, decarbonisation and lower-carbon fuels’. In February 2023, ADNOC delivered 137,000 cubic metres of LNG – its first at that point to Germany – to the Elbehafen floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) LNG terminal in Brunsbüttel.
  
  Consequently, Trump still has something of a foundation energy relationship to work on with the UAE, and the Arab state never cancelled the Abraham Accord with Israel either. Hopes are high in Washington that the new Presidential Administration will once again be able to resuscitate the full plan for the UAE over time. As detailed in my latest book, this is centred on the U.S. investing heavily in the UAE’s oil and gas sectors in order to substantially increase the production of both, which would then be directed principally towards India, rather than China, as the primary long-term Asian destination. Washington still sees India as the natural political, economic, and military counterpoint to China’s dominance in Asia, so playing a pivotal role between it and the UAE’s energy resources would benefit Washington’s ambitions both there and in the Middle East. Additionally helpful to the U.S. is that the UAE already has a very close energy relationship with India to build on, with ADNOC being the only overseas company allowed to store crude oil in India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). This is mainly done at the Mangalore strategic storage facility, with the other major SPR pool being at Padur. India has also allowed ADNOC to export this oil to allow it greater operational flexibility. Leveraging this relationship further both from the UAE side into India and from India back into the Middle East is also intended by the U.S. to enable India to make substantive progress on its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy as an alternative to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-01-23
  The Vulnerability of Undersea Infrastructure in an Era of Rising Tensions
  Attacks on strategic undersea telecom cables off the coast of Taiwan are not new, but when one was suspected of being severed off its northern coast by a Chinese-owned ship in early January, it fit a growing pattern. Just a few weeks earlier, a Russian-flagged... Read more Attacks on strategic undersea telecom cables off the coast of Taiwan are not new, but when one was suspected of being severed off its northern coast by a Chinese-owned ship in early January, it fit a growing pattern.
  
  Just a few weeks earlier, a Russian-flagged ship had cut an electricity cable running between Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea.
  
  That followed several similar developments in the Baltic involving Chinese-flagged ships harming undersea infrastructure, including severing fiber-optic cables in November and damaging a gas pipeline in October 2023.
  
  For Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as Lithuania’s foreign minister until December, the string of incidents highlights how the dividing lines between simmering tensions with the West and Russia over the war in Ukraine are blurring with China’s aggression in the South China Sea as it claims the self-ruled island of Taiwan as its own.
  
  “There shouldn’t be any doubt that Russia is behind these incidents in the Baltic,” Landsbergis told RFE/RL in an interview as he visited Taiwan. “For China, there is no clear attribution, but if it wanted to build up pressure on Taiwan through a shadow war by cutting cables, there are lessons to learn about that from Moscow.”
  
  While China has supported Russia diplomatically since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, helped its economy, and bolstered its war effort by supplying dual-use technology for the battlefield, the prospect of growing coordination between Beijing and Moscow represents a new challenge for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.
  
  "China is trying to create a new normal around Taiwan,” Chiu Chui-cheng, the minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the body that spearheads relations with Beijing, told RFE/RL. “Beijing’s goal is to shrink the buffer zone between us and make it that much easier for it to escalate, if it decides to.”
  
  The recent cable incident is the latest of what Chiu says has been a steady uptick in such events -- ranging from new military exercises intended to simulate a blockade of the island to a threefold increase in suspected Chinese espionage cases -- meant to lay the groundwork for future moves against Taiwan.
  
  “We don’t see these as accidents, we see them as strategy,” he said, referring to an increase in incidents targeting undersea infrastructure around Taiwan in recent years.
  
  Living In The 'Gray Zone'
  
  Fears over a potential Chinese invasion are far from the surface of everyday life in Taiwan’s lush, urban capital.
  
  But the realities of these shifting dynamics are also setting in. During his campaign, Trump said that Taiwan doesn’t pay enough for its own defense and raised doubts over the level of U.S. support in the event of a Chinese invasion.
  
  For the island’s policymakers, that’s raised concerns that severing underseas cables as part of so-called “gray zone” operations -- the term often used by Taiwanese officials to refer to the hybrid tactics used to intimidate the island but which remain below the threshold for war -- will make it harder to defend against Chinese aggression should it escalate to an outright attack.
  
  China has denied involvement in the January cable damage in Taiwan and investigations into the incidents in the Baltic Sea are still under way.
  
  While these cable episodes highlight the vulnerability of crucial offshore infrastructure and the difficulties in prosecuting sabotage, analysts say that they are part of a worrying new security climate in frontline areas near Ukraine and Taiwan that could easily escalate in the coming years as Trump takes office.
  
  “These hybrid tactics that we’re seeing from China and Russia are meant to create favorable conditions for them if an opening presents itself to carry out a larger move,” Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL. “It seems there is also a desire to signal some red lines to Washington as Trump comes into office.”
  
  A New Normal
  
  While Trump has vowed to quickly end the war in Ukraine, the risk of tensions between Beijing and Taipei escalating into a conflict appears to be rising.
  
  U.S. officials have warned in recent years that China is preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan, a call echoed by Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for secretary of state, during his January 15 U.S. Senate confirmation hearing.
  
  “We need to wrap our head around the fact that unless something dramatic changes, like an equilibrium [between China and Taiwan], where they conclude that the costs of intervening in Taiwan are too high, we're going to have to deal with this before the end of this decade," Rubio said.
  
  Added to the rise in hybrid encounters and growing tensions is stepped-up military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.
  
  Recently, Chinese and Russian bombers have flown exercises near Alaska, conducted naval drills together off the coast of South Africa, and carried out live fire exercises in the South China Sea.
  
  The joint war games are part of a pattern of more than a decade of enhanced military coordination and one of the more visible expressions of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s alignment, which is held together by a shared desire to counterbalance the United States.
  
  The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, has recorded 102 joint war games, multilateral military drills, or patrols from 2003 to the end of July 2024. Since then, an additional four exercises involving China and Russia have occurred. According to CSIS data, their militaries held at least four and as many as 10 joint drills each year between 2014 and 2023. The two countries carried out 11 exercises together in 2024.
  
  U.S. policymakers have repeatedly warned in recent years about the risks posed by China and Russia’s growing partnership -- from economic support to growing military cooperation -- with one congressionally mandated report describing China and Russia’s deepening alignment as “the most significant strategic development in recent years.”
  
  “As a military planner, you need to prepare for the worst-case scenario, which is Russia and China teaming up in a major way,” said Elizabeth Wishnick, a senior researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses who studies Chinese foreign policy.
  
  Taken together, the trend raises difficult questions for the Trump administration and other U.S. policymakers who have long factored how to deal with each nuclear-armed power separately, but now must plan for the risk of dealing with both, especially how China and Russia could act together in any potential future conflict in Europe or the Asia-Pacific.
  
  “It’s still unclear how this would all play out and this isn’t a true military alliance,” said Wishnick. “But within the contours of where Beijing and Moscow like their cooperation to be, it’s growing.” Source: Oilprice.com